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INTRODUCTION
It is common, in both academic and judicial discussion, to hear
participants draw reference to First Amendment values when crafting
Fourth Amendment arguments. In 2014, for example, Chief Justice
Roberts - writing for a unanimous Court - extolled the importance of
robust protections for smart phone searches, given that phones today
contain records of our most intimate "interests [and] concerns,"' as
well as comprehensive data about location and movement.2 Similarly,
in 2012, Justice Sotomayor spoke (in concurrence) of the "familial,
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations" revealed by
GPS tracking, an observation that became the factual linchpin of her
* Kiel would like to thank the editors of Volume 61 of the Howard Law Journal for
inviting him to participate in this wonderful symposium and helping to get the resulting article
into publishable shape.
1. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014).
2. See id. ("Historic location information is a standard feature on many smart phones and
can reconstruct someone's specific movements down to the minute, not only around town but
also within a particular building.").
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view that prolonged GPS surveillance amounts to a Fourth Amendment "search."'
These types of statements echo decades of scholarly commentary,4 and they find support among lower courts. With an eye toward
the First Amendment, trial and appellate judges have pushed back
against bulk metadata collection,' as well as warrantless seizures of
communication and location records.6 Furthermore, holdings like
these hearken back to foundational Supreme Court cases from the
pre-digital age, such as Berger v. New York,' which invalidated a wiretapping statute that permitted warrants to issue without probable
cause; NAACP v. Alabama,' which forbade the compulsory publication of membership lists; and DOJ v. Reporters' Committee for Freedom of Press,' which limited the permissible scope of disclosure of
3. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). For another example of work drawing the same connection between Riley and Jones, see Margot Kaminski & Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect: FirstAmendment Implications of Surveillance,
Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U. RicH. L. REV. 465, 479 ( 015).
4. For especially lucid statements of this normative position - which thoroughly canvass
the past literature - see Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth
Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614 (2009); Neil Richards,
Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEx. L. REV. 387, 400 (2008) (lamenting the fact that "government access
to records and private papers" has historically been conceptualized as an exclusively "Fourth
rather than [I First Amendment [problem]" - and calling for greater conceptual unity between
the two); Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. REv. 507, 524-28 (2005). For background on
the historical connection between the First and Fourth Amendments, see Part I of Kiel BrennanMarquez, The ConstitutionalLimits of Private Surveillance, KAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
5. See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 824 (2d Cir. 2015) (expounding the "weighty constitutional issues" that new technological developments raise in the surveillance area). See also
Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 30-32 (D.D.C. 2013) (arguing that technological advances
- allowing the government glean First Amendment-sensitive information via bulk metadata collection and analysis - requires limiting the reach of Smith v. Maryland).
6. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that warrantless
seizures of user email subvert reasonable expectations of privacy and violate the Fourth Amendment), vacated on other grounds; United States v. DiTomasso, 56 F. Supp. 3d 584, 591-92
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (same); United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562-63 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in location data, because it "can reveal
preferences, alignments, associations, personal ails, and foibles") (internal citations omitted).
See also Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thorton, 44 P.3d 1044 (Colo. 2002) (holding that warrants
for the seizure of bookstore records are subject to heightened scrutiny due to their First Amendment implications); In re Search of www.disruptj20.org, 2017 WL 4569548 (D.C. Super. Ct. Oct.
10, 2017) (limiting the scope of webhost provider's obligation under a warrant for IP addresses
and other information - sought and received by the Department of Justice - on the grounds that
the warrant, as written, could allow the government to "rummage through the information contained on [the target's] website and discover the identity of, or access communications by, individuals not participating in alleged criminal activity, particularly those persons who were
engaging in protected First Amendment activities.").
7. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
8. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
9. DOJ v. Reporters' Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
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Interpreting Constitutional Provisions in Tandem
criminal records. While these cases concerned distinct legal questions,
all three drew a link between privacy interests, on one hand, and individual expression and political participation, on the other.
At some level, the impulse to conceptualize Fourth Amendment
rules in tandem with First Amendment values is so familiar that it
hardly even registers as distinctive. That constraints on law enforcement power - and surveillance power, in particular - should take their
cues from expressive, associational, and democratic principles verges
on self-evident. Yet the practice remains curiously undertheorized.
What does it mean to interpret discrete constitutional provisions "in
tandem"? It comes as little surprise, of course, that discrete constitutional provisions sometimes come into contact, and when that happens, that harmonization becomes necessary. That dynamic is true (at
least potentially) of every legal text. But to say that courts should
avoid sowing conflict between discrete constitutional provisions tells
us little, if anything, about the proper approach. 10 Intra-textual harmony takes different forms. What kind of analytic relationship - what
sort of harmony - should courts be aiming for?
I.

TWO APPROACHES TO INTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL
HARMONY

On this front, I see two options," and they pull in opposite directions. The first option, which I will call "jurisdictional approach," is to
taxonomize grievance-types and assign them to separate constitutional
domains. A good example is the relationship between the Fourth
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. In United States v.
Whren,12 the Court held that the question of when police may perform
searches and seizures - the Fourth Amendment issue - is orthogonal
to the question of "intentional[ ] discriminat[ion]" by individual officers.1 3 In short, if the police lacked cause to search as they searched
10. A good example is the relationship between the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause. When the state takes steps to ensure that laws do not disadvantage religion,
thereby complying with its Free Exercise obligations, there is always a risk of unduly favoring
religious groups. See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024
(2017) (explaining that the state is simultaneously obligated (1) to avoid religious establishment
and (2) not to hamper religious exercise, but also that the two aims "limit[ ]" one another).
11. In fact, there may be more than two options, but for present purposes, I leave at two;
both for simplicity's sake, given the limited room for analysis, and because I suspect - without
having thought it through exhaustively, so don't quote me here - that other options, to the
extent they exist, can ultimately be transposed into versions of these two.
12. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
13. Id. at 813.
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or to seize what they seized, you have a Fourth Amendment claim.
And if the police targeted you based on a protected trait, you have a
Fourteenth Amendment claim (and depending on the facts, of course,
you may have both). But the two claims are conceptually distinct, and
they run perpendicular.
The second option, which I will call the "gestalt approach," is to
incorporate values endogenous to one constitutional domain into the
interpretation of another. Here, unlike with the jurisdictional approach, the point is not analytic purity, but normative pluralism - to
arrive at an integrated view of constitutional value. This is the approach on display in the interpreting-the-Fourth-Amendmentthrough-the-First logic above. When judges fashion limits on police
power with an eye toward expressive, associational, and democratic
values, the idea is that First Amendment principles should influence
Fourth Amendment doctrine. The vision, in other words, is one of
overlap rather than flush edges; a porous boundary, not a rigid one.
My goal here is not to decry the use of the gestalt approach in the
context of First and Fourth Amendment values. Like many others, I
believe the assemblage of questions raised by law enforcement activity
generally, and by surveillance in particular, lends itself to the infusion
of criminal procedure with First Amendment values.
The question is why. Given that two approaches to intra-constitutional harmonization are available - in theory, certainly, but also in
practice - what justifies the adoption of one over the other? By what
criteria should a court choose the gestalt approach over the jurisdictional approach, or vice versa? After all, one can easily imagine a
world in which courts respond to the fact that surveillance can imperil
expressive, associational, and democratic values by requiring litigants
to raise actual First Amendment grievances, and concluding - as in
Whren - that such grievances, even if meritorious, should have no
bearing on the distinctively Fourth Amendment question of when police need to secure warrants. Likewise, one can imagine a version of
Whren that comes out the other way, holding that intentional discrimination should matter in assessing the reasonableness of a search or
seizure under the Fourth Amendment, even if it could also form the
(potential) basis of an Equal Protection claim.' 4
14. In fact, this is exactly what commentators critical of the Whren decision have called for.
See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Essay, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the
Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponceand Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebel-
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In short, nothing requires the use of either the jurisdictional approach or the gestalt approach. It is an interpretive choice - and one
with important consequences. So, how to choose? Are there interpretive principles that courts might use to navigate the decision, quite
apart from either the particular values at play or the policy preferences of specific judges?
II.

THREE PRINCIPLES FOR DECIDING BETWEEN THEM

In the rest of this Essay, I explore three possible answers to this
question. The first is that courts should adopt the rights-maximizing
approach; the second is that courts should adopt the most efficient
approach; and the third is that courts should adopt the approach that
renders constitutional adjudication, as an enterprise, more majestic
than technocratic.
The first two answers, I conclude, are appealing but somewhat
unstable: they supply no reason to favor one approach over the other
in principle. Instead, they offer metrics that could help courts assess
the decision case by case, domain by domain. The third answer, by
contrast, does supply a reason to favor one approach over the other in
principle - namely, the gestalt approach. I close by suggesting that (1)
this may be a virtue of the third answer, (2) the "anti-technocratic"
view of constitutional law may have implications beyond the specific
question of intra-textual harmonization, and (3) further work on this
front is warranted.1 5
A.

Rights-Maximization

One means of distinguishing the jurisdictional approach from the
gestalt approach would be to ask: which approach tends, in practice,
to vindicate the largest number of meritorious grievances? Take
Whren. One of the reasons that case continues to inspire such widespread revulsion is that it seems, in practice, to shut down colorable
accusations of racial profiling.1 6 It's all well and good, one might say,
for the Court to announce that in theory, victims of racial profiling can
lious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005 (2010); Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 425 (1997).
15. In fact - to the point of further work being warranted - I don't even mean to imply that
these three answers are exhaustive. There could be others. But given the limited space, I
thought these most merited exploration.
16. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEw JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNEss 67-72, 108-09 (2010).
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always bring Equal Protection suits against particular officers, but realistically, the likelihood of those suits coming to fruition is vanishingly small - because of the evidentiary hurdles involved; because
challenges against the police disproportionately come in the form of
suppression hearings that leave no room for Equal Protection claims;
etc. Thus (the reasoning goes), the Court's rigid bifurcation of Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments operates in practice to shield unconstitutional conduct from redress.
For someone - and I confess to being such a person - who views
Whren this way, it might be tempting to conclude that courts should
adopt the gestalt approach on the grounds of rights-maximization.
The idea would be, by allowing the values of one domain (here, those
of Equal Protection) to influence the doctrinal texture of another domain (here, the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" requirement),
courts would multiply opportunities for the enforcement of rights.
And this provides a reason, ceteris paribus, to favor the gestalt approach over the jurisdictional one.
Appealing, sure - but there's a wrinkle. Put simply, allowing the
values of one constitutional domain to influence the operation of another does not always tend to maximize rights. One clear counterexample is the Court's treatment of Free Exercise vis-A-vis Equal
Protection. In Employment Division v. Smith the Court held - in a
controversial opinion that inspired public outrage and resulted in the
passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act - that generallyapplicable laws, even when they frustrate religious exercise, are not
susceptible to a Free Exercise challenge unless they are specifically
aimed at hampering religion.1 7 In reaching this conclusion, Justice
Scalia (writing for the majority) argued that his analysis explicitly
drew strength from Equal Protection principles, which have long insulated "race-neutral laws that [merely] have the effect of disproportionately disadvantaging a particular racial group" from heightened
scrutiny." Whether the Smith Court was right to so read the Free
Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses - in tandem, subject to the
gestalt approach - is a matter of fierce and ongoing dispute.1 9 For our
purposes, the point is simply that (1) Smith plainly is an instance of
17. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
18. Id. at 886 n.3.
19. For background on this debate, see Bernadette Meyler, The Equal Protection of Free
Exercise: Two Approaches and Their History, 47 B. C. L. REV. 275, 283-84, nn. 36-40 (2006)
(compiling arguments and sources).
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gestalt interpretation, but also (2) one that constricts rights rather
than expanding them. 2 0
B.

Adjudicative Efficiency

Another means of distinguishing the jurisdictional approach from
the gestalt approach would be to focus on which one is more efficient
at identifying and resolving constitutional problems. When it comes,
say, to assessing the First Amendment implications of police surveillance, it just seems easier to allow that question to infiltrate and inform the Fourth Amendment analysis, considering that the remedies
available in a hypothetical First Amendment suit - limiting police surveillance capabilities - would likely be similar, in substance, to the
probable cause and warrant requirement. In other words, imagine if,
contra the growing trend, courts decided to strip all First Amendmentstyle reasoning out of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and instead
require plaintiffs to raise First Amendment challenges to law enforcement surveillance directly. Would such challenges, when successful,
have meaningfully different practical effects than successful Fourth
Amendment challenges to the same police practices? If not, then perhaps it makes little sense to bifurcate the two instead of consolidating
them.
Put slightly differently, the gestalt approach can be imagined as a
species of joinder. Sure - one might think - if courts had infinite resources and cared about splitting conceptual hairs, they should, in theory, require litigants to bring Fourth Amendment and First
Amendment challenges separately. But in the real world, why
bother? At a practical level, this kind of wooden bifurcation - as required by the jurisdictional approach - serves only to confuse the issues and to deter important litigation from getting off the ground.
Hence, the gestalt approach should win the day.
As with the first answer, there is something undeniably appealing
about this logic - but also a caveat. The premise here, of course, is
20. Indeed, for many critics of Smith, the whole point is that the Court should have adopted
the jurisdictional approach on rights-maximizing grounds. The idea, in other words, is that
equality grievances and Free Exercise grievances should be afforded their own domains, so as to
increase constitutional protection for people of religious faith. On this view, when laws target
religion, that poses an equal protection problem (because religion is a protected class), but even
laws that implicate religious exercise incidentally would also be suspect, under certain circumstances, on Free Exercise grounds. When the See, e.g., Jesse Choper, The Rise and the Decline of
the Constitutional Protection of Religious Liberty, 70 NEB. L. REV. 651 (1991) (arguing, along
these lines, for a view of Free Exercise that overflows the requirements of equality).
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that adjudicating an issue through Vehicle One will be functionally
similar, if not identical, to adjudicating the same issue through Vehicle
Two. Yet that premise easily comes under strain. Imagine, for example, a hypothetical First Amendment challenge to the NYPD's patrol
patterns in certain areas of Brooklyn. The theory is that by patrolling
intensively during the day, the NYPD is chilling association - and all
of its concomitant democratic values - in places like parks. Under
existing First Amendment doctrine, this challenge would face a tough
road. But its fate would ultimately depend on the facts. Are police
targeting particular areas because of the impact of association? Are
the parks and other public places subject to targeting those that play
host to a disproportionately large share of political activity? Is there
any evidence about the origins, or the official purpose, of the program? And so forth.
The point, however, is not about the viability of this hypothetical
First Amendment suit. The point is that if the same claim were raised
in the context of a Fourth Amendment challenge, there is no way it
would prevail. If a defendant, facing prosecution based on evidence in
a public space like a park, were to argue that police should be constrained from patrolling in public spaces - given the practice's clear
First Amendment implications - the claim would be dismissed out of
hand. For Fourth Amendment purposes, the police are allowed to patrol as much (or little) as they like in public - full stop. Of course, this
does not mean the First Amendment challenge, qua First Amendment
challenge, is doomed. What it does mean, however, is that presenting
the First Amendment question through the vehicle of a Fourth
Amendment suit may well distort, rather than clarify, the constitutional inquiry. And if did, the overall landscape of constitutional adjudication would be less efficient for it.
C.

Anti-Technocracy

A final means of distinguishing the jurisdictional approach from
the gestalt approach would be to focus on the theory of constitutionalism each instantiates. The jurisdictional approach imagines the Constitution as a checklist of requirements and prohibitions, each to be
enforced in its own province, without spillover. The gestalt approach,
by contrast, imagines the Constitution as an integrated vision of public
value - a pattern of interwoven norms that breathes practical life to
the ideal of limited government and self-rule.
608
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Both conceptions of the Constitution ring familiar. The document is a checklist of requirements and prohibitions, and it also codifies an integrated vision of public value. In closing, however, I want to
suggest that the integrated view has a performative aspect that the
checklist view lacks. The gestalt approach renders constitutional law a
grander enterprise than other, more quotidian forms of legal disputeresolution. It casts the interpretive practice as one in which all of us,
as observer-participants in the project of popular sovereignty, can
share - rather than a technical undertaking to be understood and pursued exclusively by lawyers and judges.21
Perhaps the point, like many legal arguments, is best conveyed by
analogy. In a short per curium opinion in 2014, the Supreme Court
reversed a decision by the Fifth Circuit dismissing, without leave to
amend, a retaliation suit against a police department solely because
the plaintiffs - ex-employees of the department - failed to explicitly
invoke § 1983 in their complaint.2 2 To so penalize this omission, the
Court held, would elevate form over substance. It would confuse an
"imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim" with a
genuine legal deficiency.2 3
This holding is far from remarkable; if anything, the remarkable
thing is that the Fifth Circuit, like the district court before it, managed
to view the issue differently. 24 But in spite of its modesty, the holding
reflects an important and enduring principle: that constitutional law
the. adjudication of basic rights - is not some kind of lawyer's parlor
game, buttressed by technicality. It is not a frivolity. It is not a conceit. It is not an effort, as Christopher Schmidt recently put it, that
can be reduced to "craft[ing] elegant, clean doctrine," if doing so
comes at the expense of our "share[d] ... project of giving meaning to
the Constitution." 2 5
Working out exactly what this principle means, let alone exactly
how it applies to the distinction between jurisdictional v. gestalt approaches to intra-constitutional harmony, lies beyond the scope of this
21. See generally Kiel Brennan-Marquez & Paul Kahn, Statutes and Democratic Self-Au-

thorship, 56 WM. & MARY L. REv. 115 (2014) (arguing, with regard to both statutory and constitutional interpretation, that popular sovereignty depends on the ability of the we, the people to
see legal outcomes as the product of our collective will).
22. See Johnson v. City of Shelby, 135 S. Ct. 346, 346 (2014).
23. Id. at 346.
24. See Johnson v. City of Shelby, 743 F.3d 59 (5th Cir. 2013).
25. Christopher W. Schmidt, On Doctrinal Confusion: The Case of the State Action Doctrine, 2016 BYU L. REv. 575, 625 (2016).
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brief essay. More work lies in store. For now, the point is simply that
if doctrinal pristineness is a virtue, it is an exclusively instrumental
one; it is a virtue to the extent it renders constitutional law relatable to
the observer-participants who are, after all, its subjects and its authors.2 6 And the risk - in general, but here specifically instantiated in
the jurisdictional approach - is that pristineness will be mistaken for
an end in itself. That the law will be clear, perhaps painstakingly so;
but it will no longer be our own.

26. See Brennan-Marquez & Kahn, supra note 21, at 173-77 (2014) (explaining that popular
sovereignty - rule by the people - requires us, as a polity, to be able to see legal outcomes as the
product of our own will).
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